In some encryption systems it is necessary to preserve the format and length of the encrypted data. This kind of encryption is called FPE (Format Preserving Encryption). Currently, only two AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) modes of operation recommended by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) are able to implement FPE algorithms, FF1 and FF3. These modes work in an electronic codebook fashion and can be configured to encrypt databases with an arbitrary format and length. However, there are no stream cipher proposals able to implement FPE encryption for high data rate information flows. The main novelty of this work is a new block cipher operation mode proposal to implement an FPE algorithm in a stream cipher fashion. It has been called CTR-MOD and it is based on a standard block cipher working in CTR (Counter) mode and a modulo operation. The confidentiality of this mode is analyzed in terms of its IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack) advantage of any adversary attacking it. Moreover, the encryption scheme has been implemented on an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and has been integrated in a Gigabit Ethernet interface to test an encrypted optical link with a real high data rate traffic flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Format Preserving Encryption, FPE, is a kind of encryption used to cipher a plaintext preserving its original length and format [1] - [3] . In the past, some of the first FPE solutions [4] , [5] , were based mainly on the use of a standard binary block cipher working in a known operation mode. According to them, if the plaintext is in radix S, it must be added modulo-S to the block cipher output to produce the ciphertext. Although these techniques are based on standard modes of operation, also used to build stream ciphers, no argument for their security has been given. In addition, in some of them it is necessary to use an unbiasing operation when S is not a power of two [4] .
There have been many other proposals for this type of encryption [6] , but the only ones approved by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) are the modes FF1 and FF3 [7] . FF1, originally called FFX (Format-preserving Feistel-based Encryption), was proposed The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek . by Bellare et al. [8] , whereas FF3 corresponds to the BPS-BC component proposed by Brier et al. [9] . Both operation modes are based on a non-binary Feistel structure, similar to that shown in Fig. 1 , and they are able to encrypt blocks of data with an arbitrary format in an ECB (Electronic Code Book) fashion. In fact, although they are operation modes using AES as the underlying block cipher, they can be considered directly as a kind of FPE block ciphers.
Some application examples for FPE are the encryption of databases with an arbitrary format [6] , [10] - [12] such as PANs (Primary Account Numbers) or SSNs (Social Security Numbers), which are not in binary format. Also, FPE can be used in communication systems when it is necessary to encrypt certain protocols, for example, in military or industrial environments [13] , [14] , or when encrypting some image formats [15] .
Regarding the performance of FPE encryption methods, some studies have been done, however they are mainly related to software implementations [14] , [16] - [18] . For performance benefits, a hardware implementation could be considered as in [13] , [19] or [20] . A hardware implementation of an FPE stream cipher could be advantageous for that cases where a high encryption rate is important and the plaintext format preservation is mandatory. A tentative solution for this cases could be also the usage of a standard stream cipher, however this would not be a valid solution. As an example, let us to imagine a plaintext formed by symbols in decimal radix. Each symbol will be represented with 4 bits. Then we could try to encrypt the plaintext thanks to a standard stream cipher generating a keystream formed by 4-bit words, which would produce 4-bit ciphertext symbols. As the keystream generator output could be considered random and uniformly distributed, then the XOR operation between the keystream and the plaintext would not guarantee a ciphertext also in decimal radix. For example, if the XOR operation between a symbol of the plaintext and the keystream produced a ciphertext value between 11 and 15, then the resulting value would not maintain the original format. If we needed to preserve the format (length and radix) of the plaintext, the described encryption mechanism with a standard stream cipher would not be valid.
An application example for the utility of FPE stream ciphers could be in [20] or [21] , where a Gigabit Ethernet data flow must be encrypted at line rate preserving the 8b/10b encoding properties, which means preserving its format.
Some FPE stream ciphers have been proposed. For example, in the FF3 mode [9] , the basic FPE block cipher component BPS-BC is proposed to be used in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode, while in [20] , it is proposed to be used in CTR (Counter) mode, as CTR can be considered the best and most modern way to achieve confidentiality-only encryption [22] . In [21] , another proposed solution consisted of using a conventional stream cipher whose output was subjected to a modulo-S operation to encrypt a plaintext in radix S. However, in this case the security is not clear as the bias introduced by the modulo-S operation is not analyzed.
The main novelty of this work is the proposal of an FPE stream cipher solution that reduces the hardware complexity of possible solutions based on FPE modes (FF1 and FF3) and is based on a recommended binary block cipher. Moreover, by means of a new operation mode that could use a standard block cipher, such as AES, it is possible to develop a formal security proof, in the same way that is usually done with traditional confidentiality-only operation modes, as in CTR or CBC. The formal security proof consists in the analysis of the IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack) advantage expression of any adversary attacking the proposed mode.
The proposed encryption mode in this work has been called CTR-MOD. To parametrize its resulting structure, a comparison of this mode with other taken as reference has been done in terms of their IND-CPA advantage expressions. The idea is to establish the condition under which CTR-MOD has at least the same or greater security than the reference mode when encrypting the same amount of information. Particularly, the mode used as reference has been CTR, since, as mentioned before, it can be considered the best to achieve confidentiality-only encryption [22] .
CTR-MOD mode consists of a standard block cipher working in CTR mode plus a modulo-S operation applied to its output, which is added modulo-S to the plaintext. As shown in Fig. 2a , the keystream, plaintext and ciphertext will be also in radix S. In this figure the block size of the block cipher is l bits, from which L are taken and used as input for the modulo-S operator. The output values from the modulo-S operator will be in the range {0, . . . , S − 1} and will be represented with B bits where B = log 2 S . The paper is divided in eight sections. In Section II both modes CTR and CTR-MOD are introduced, Section III details the IND-CPA advantage expression for CTR-MOD mode. Subsequently, Section IV makes a comparison between the security expression of CTR and CTR-MOD modes to parametrize the resulting structure of the proposed mode. In Section V the application case where the proposed mode has been applied, optical Gigabit Ethernet communication, is described. The implementation and some encryption results of CTR-MOD in the mentioned application case are shown in Sections VI and VII, respectively. Finally, in Section VIII conclusions are given.
II. CTR AND CTR-MOD MODES
Concrete security analysis for CTR mode was originally established in [23] . This operation mode is a stateful (counter based and deterministic) encryption scheme.
Let us consider a family of PRF (Pseudo Random Function) functions F such that F : K × {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L where L is the block size, K is the keyspace and F K is a PRF from this family configured with a random key K taken randomly from K (K K). The plaintext is formed by a group of m L-bit blocks M = {MB 0 , MB 1 , . . . ,MB m−1 } and it is encrypted resulting in a ciphertext formed also by m L-bit blocks C = {CB 0 , CB 1 , . . . ,CB m−1 } thanks to its encryption function CTR(M , ctr), as described in Algorithm 1.
The inputs of CTR(M , ctr) are the message M itself and the initial value of the counter ctr, which is considered the state of this algorithm. CNT i and KB i are the values of the counter and keystream block in each encryption step. The l-bit counter values are encrypted thanks to the underlying encryption function F K giving rise to the L-bit keystream blocks. The last counter value CNT m−1 will be used as next initial ctr value for the next invocation of CTR(M , ctr).
The new proposed structure for the mode CTR-MOD of Fig. 2a can be decomposed as shown in Fig. 2b , where the block cipher in Fig. 2a has been modeled as a PRF E K . The least significant L output bits of E K are taken as input of the modulo-S operation, which is equivalent to perform the modulo-2 L operation at the output of E K . In this proposed mode we have called F K and E K _MOD to the functions such that F K (x) = E K _MOD (x) = E K (x) mod2 L . In this case, as in CTR(M ,ctr) algorithm, F K in Fig. 2b can be considered a PRF such that F : which means that it maps the space of values 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to the range 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 . In Fig. 2b the whole module formed by F K and the modulo-S operation has been called F K _MOD, which means that F K _MOD(x) = F K (x) modS. We can also consider F K _MOD a PRF such that F K _MOD : K × {0, 1} l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}, as it maps integer values from 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to {0, . . . ,S − 1}, where S is not necessarily a power of two.
By taking into account Fig. 2b and the definition of F K _MOD, the encryption function of CTR-MOD scheme is described in Algorithm 2. This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 but using F K _MOD function instead of F K and the addition modulo-S instead of the XOR operation (addition modulo-2). Also, the plaintext, ciphertext and keystream are formed by m symbols in radix S instead of m L-bit blocks.
III. CTR-MOD IND-CPA SECURITY
Usually the security of traditional operation modes for only confidentiality is studied in the sense of IND-CPA security [24] . The attack model is a game between an active adversary A and an encryption oracle performing the encryption scheme SE configured with a key K and a configuration bit b.
During the game the adversary chooses a sequence of s pairs formed by two equal length messages (M 0 1 , M 1 1 ), . . . , (M 0 s , M 1 s ). For each pair of messages (M 0 i , M 1 i ) the adveresary receives from the oracle the ciphertext C i corresponding to the message M b i . Finally the adversary must guess whether (M 0 1 , . . . , M 0 s ) or (M 1 1 , . . . , M 1 s ) were encrypted during the game. It means that the adversary has to guess the value of the configuration bit b after performing the s queries. Supposing that the SE is CTR, in Fig. 3 a scheme of the game is shown. In this figure, for each message M b i with a length of m i L-bit blocks the oracle performs the CTR encryption as in Algorithm 1, generating m i keystream blocks KB of length L bits. Symbol '&' represents the concatenation of the m i keystream blocks that have to be XORed with M b i . To measure the success of the adversary in breaking a symmetric encryption scheme SE, the adversary advantage is defined in [25] as in the following equation:
where the ADV IND−CPA SE (A) is the IND-CPA advantage of the adversary A over the encryption scheme SE, and Pr b = b is the probability of the adversary A of guessing the correct value of configuration bit b. The advantage of A can be understood as the excess of this probability over 1/2. When the 'guess' probability is almost 1/2 and then the adversary advantage is negligible the encryption scheme SE can be considered secure. IND-CPA advantage for CTR mode can be expressed as in Theorem 1, which is proven in [23] .
Theorem 1: Let F K : K × {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L be the underlying function of the encryption scheme SE that corresponds with CTR symmetric encryption mode. Let A be an adversary attacking the IND-CPA security of SE that asks at most s queries formed each one by a pair of messages (M 0 i , M 1 i ) with a length of m i blocks with L-bit length each one. The s message queries will produce a total number of qL-bit encrypted blocks which means that q = i=s i=1 m i . Then an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of F K and performingueries) can be built thanks to A, such that:
where ADV PRF F K (B) is the prf-advantage [24] of any adversary B over F K and ADV IND−CPA CTR (A) is the IND-CPA advantage of A over the encryption scheme CTR.
Our purpose is to obtain the IND-CPA advantage for CTR-MOD to compare its security with the typical CTR scheme and in this way extract the necessary conditions to achieve at least the same or greater security. It can be proved that this advantage can be expressed as in the following theorem:
. . ,S − 1} be the underlying function of the encryption scheme SE that corresponds with CTR-MOD symmetric encryption mode. Let A be an adversary attacking the IND-CPA security of SE that asks at most s queries formed each one for a pair of messages (M 0 i , M 1 i ) with a length of m i symbols of radix S. The s message queries will produce a total number of q encrypted symbols, which means that q = i=s i=1 m i . Then it is possible to build an adversary D (attacking the PRF security of E K and performingueries) such that:
where ADV PRF E K (D) is the prf-advantage of any adversary D over E K as defined in [24] , E K corresponds to the block cipher that is part of the F K _MOD function and I is the difference between L (the input bit length of modulo-S operation in F K _MOD) and T , with T = log 2 S. The proof of this theorem is developed in the Appendix A thanks to the games described in Table 1 and the definition of the prf-advantage term ADV PRF F K . The explanation of these games and the term ADV PRF F K are described in Appendix B.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS: CTR-MOD VS CTR
Although usually block ciphers are analyzed as PRFs, PRPs (Pseudo Random Permutation) are what best models them. Thanks to the PRF-PRP switching lemma [23] it is possible to relate the PRF and PRP advantages of an adversary against a block cipher as shown in (4). where ADV PRF E K (A) and ADV PRP E K (A) are the prf-advantage and prp-advantage of adversary A against block cipher E K , respectively. The block size is l and the number of encryption queries performed by the adversary during the prf-advantage game is q.
According to (4), equations (2) and (3) of Theorems 1 and 2 can be rewritten as:
where E K is the underlying block cipher used in both modes, q CTR and q CTR−MOD are the number of encrypted blocks and symbols during the IND-CPA games of each mode, and l CTR and l CTR−MOD are the block sizes of E K in CTR and CTR-MOD, respectively. By each encrypted block CTR mode encrypts l CTR information bits, while by each encrypted symbol CTR-MOD encrypts T information bits (T = log 2 S). Therefore the total number of encrypted bits in each mode during the IND-CPA game is µ CTR = q CTR · l CTR and µ CTR−MOD = q CTR−MOD · T , respectively. According to this, it is possible to express the advantages of equations (5) and (6) in terms of the encrypted bits and compare them with the expressions of other well-known operation modes, as shown in Table 2 .
As mentioned in Section I, we want to parametrize CTR-MOD and establish under what condition it has at least the same security as the classical CTR scheme when encrypting the same amount of information, with µ CTR = µ CTR−MOD = µ. It means that we want to know the constraints needed to get the following condition:
If we assume that E K is in both modes a secure and a recommended cipher we can consider that it is a good PRP and has a great prp-security, which means that the term ADV PRP E K is negligible for both expressions (5) and (6) . Then it is only needed to compare the second terms of both expressions to meet (7) , as shown in the following equation:
As (8) can be rewritten as:
It is possible to rewrite (9) as:
In (10) I = L − T , where L is the input bit length of modulo-S operation in CTR-MOD mode. If we define the difference in bits between the output of the block cipher E K and the input to the modulo-S operation as P = l CTR−MOD − L, it is possible to rewrite (10) as:
As µ ≥ 1 and P ≥ 0, then the lowest bound for L that always meets (11) is:
It is possible to conclude that if the underlying block ciphers used in CTR and CTR-MOD modes have the same prp-security, and the block size l CTR−MOD ≥ L, then CTR-MOD scheme can have equal or better IND-CPA security than CTR when encrypting the same amount of information. It is important to notice that the block size l CTR−MOD used in CTR-MOD will depend on the block size l CTR of the CTR mode used as reference and the radix S of the plaintext, as T = log 2 S. Expression in (12) will be the constraint necessary to achieve condition (7) .
V. APPLICATION CASE: ETHERNET 1000BASE-X
As we have mentioned in Section I, as far as the authors are concerned, there are no standardized solutions for FPE stream ciphers and its usage could be relevant in the cases where a high encryption rate is necessary. For example, in the case of the encryption in 1000Base-X standard for Gigabit Ethernet optical links [20] .
The encryption in a layered communication model such as TCP/IP can be performed at different levels of the communication, such as in layers 2 or 3 with MACsec or IPsec standards, respectively. Although encryption in physical layer (layer 1) is less usual than in other layers some proposals have been made, for example related with photonic [26]- [29] or radio [30] , [31] technologies or with the physical layer protocols [20] , [21] , [32] .
One of the key benefits of performing the encryption at layer 1 is the possibility of masking the data traffic pattern, then achieving additional privacy, which permits to hide the existence of data transmission as in [26] with the optical steganography or in [20] with the encryption at encoding sublayer.
Our application case is the standard 1000Base-X, as in [20] , [21] . In both cases the encryption is performed in one of the sublayers of physical layer, where the 8b/10b encoding is performed. This sublayer is called PCS (Physical Coding Sublayer). The 8b/10b encoding at PCS is used to provide certain properties to the bitstream that is transmitted through the Gigabit Ethernet optical link, such as DC balance, high transition density and short run length. Ciphering at PCS level must be performed in a way that the 8b/10b encoding properties are preserved, which means that the encryption method must preserve the same format in the plaintext and the ciphertext.
On the other hand, encryption and decryption modules must be located in the 1000Base-X datapath as shown in Fig. 4 , where an optical Ethernet interface is shown.
In order to preserve the coding properties, the encryption of an 8b/10b symbol must give as result another valid 8b/10b symbol, which means to perform an FPE encryption. Ciphered symbols must be within the alphabet of symbols supported by the encoding standard. For this reason, the generic structure of the ENCRYPT module is built as shown in Fig. 5 .
In Fig. 5 , since S is the possible number of valid 8b/10b symbols, these are mapped to an integer value in the range {0, . . . , S − 1}, giving rise to a plaintext in radix S. Then a modulo-S addition is performed between the mapped symbols and a keystream also represented with values in the range {0, . . . , S − 1}. After that, the resulting ciphered values are reverse-mapped to its corresponding 8b/10b symbols which are finally encoded to 10-bit values and sent to the serializer. In the 1000Base-X standard only 267 possible symbols are valid in the 8b/10b encoding, which means that S =267.
In this work, CTR-MOD operation mode has been used to perform the keystream generation and the modulo-S addition of Fig. 5 , in the same way as Algorithm 2 of Section II.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
We assume that we want to achieve at least the same or better IND-CPA security than a recommended block cipher working in CTR mode. Let be the block and key size of this reference block cipher a standard length of 128 bits. According to (12) if l CTR = 128 bits, and T = log 2 S ∼ = 8.06 bits, then l CTR−MOD must be l CTR−MOD ≥ L ≥ 149 bits to achieve the security that meets condition (7) . By taking into account these parameters, proposed CTR-MOD structure has been adapted to the generic scheme of Fig. 5 . The resulting encryption scheme is shown in Fig. 6 .
As the underlying block cipher must have a block size greater than 128 bits because l CTR−MOD ≥ 149, the wellknown Rijndael [33] cipher has been used. The main difference between Rijndael and AES (Advance Encryption Standard) is the range of configuration values for the block size and the key length, in fact AES is a subset of Rijndael. While in AES the block size is fixed to 128 bits, in Rijndael it can take three values, 128, 192 and 256 bits. In this work Rijndael has been configured with 192 bit block size and a 128 bit key length, which means l CTR−MOD = 192.
The block MOD_2 149 of Fig. 6 is simply to take the 149 least significant bits of the Rijndael output. However, the second modulo operation, the MOD_267 module, takes more resources as 267 is not a power of two. Its implementation has been based on [34] , which presents a high-speed hardware structure for a generic operation 'x mod z'.
The final structure shown in Fig. 6 has been synthetized using a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. Regarding the hardware resources used, they have been compared in Table 3 with other solutions based in the mentioned FF1 and FF3 modes for FPE [13] , [20] , and an ad-hoc stream cipher [21] . In this table, the amount of registers, LUTs (Look Up Tables) and BRAMs (Block RAMs) are shown. According to these results it is possible to conclude that the solution in this work achieves a better figure in Encryption_Rate/Slice than the others.
Finally, to test the encryption mechanism with real traffic, the KEYSTREAM_GENERATOR and CIPHER OPER-ATION modules of Fig. 6 have been integrated in the ENCRYPT and DECRYPT modules of the Ethernet Interface in Fig. 4 . Two Ethernet Interfaces have been implemented in the Xilinx FPGA platform as shown in Fig.7 . The PHY sides of both interfaces have been connected to optical SFP (Small Form Factor Pluggable) modules able to transmit at 1 Gbps data rate through a fiber link. Also two Ethernet Frame Generators have been connected to the MAC sides of both Ethernets Interfaces to test the encrypted link with real traffic. With these generators it is possible to produce Ethernet frame flows configured with different frame size, payload and interframe gap.
Note that in Table 3 we have only compared the solution in this work with other FPE solutions. A comparison of the proposed system with other well-known binary stream cipher implementations could be done. However, as mentioned in Section I this kind of ciphers cannot be a valid solution to preserve the format of the plaintext. In addition, although stream ciphers are suitable for high speed applications, their cryptanalysis and design criteria are less understood than block ciphers [35] . Indeed, a stream cipher application can be implemented easily thanks to a secure block cipher such as AES working in CTR mode, considered secure thanks to its formal security proof [23] . In the same way CTR-MOD mode can be considered enough safe as an FPE stream cipher structure.
VII. ENCRYPTION RESULTS
As mentioned in previous Section, one of the key benefits of performing the encryption at layer 1 is the possibility of masking the data traffic pattern, achieving additional privacy, as possible passive attackers are not able to detect the presence of current communications.
In the particular case of 1000Base-X, the transmission of 8b/10b symbols is carried out constantly, including in the case no frame is being transmitted or during the gap between frames. In these situations, the PHY always transmits idle sets of 8b/10b symbols, whose purpose is to maintain the synchronization between remote terminals.
To check the masking capability of the encryption, the SE (Shannon Entropy) in (13) has been measured for different encrypted and non-encrypted frame traffic patterns. The 8b/10b symbol stream for each traffic pattern, mapped between 0 and S − 1, has been grouped in tuples of t symbols called β t , and the probability for each tuple, P(β t ), has been calculated. Particularly, SE has been measured for values of t equals to 1 and 2.
Ideally, if every t-tuple (β t ) is equally likely with probability P (β t ) = p = S −t the value of Shannon Entropy for every t should be equals to SE = log 2 S = log 2 267 ∼ = 8.0606.
In Fig. 8 the SE measured for different traffic patterns is shown. Pattern A corresponds with no frame transmission, where only idle sets are transmitted over the link. Patterns B, C and D correspond to continuous frame transmission of 1024-bytes length with random payload at rates of 10.2%, 50% and 91% of the maximum Gigabit line rate. Pattern E corresponds to continuous frame transmission of random length and payload and minimum gap between frames. The non-encrypted versions of these patterns have different SE, however every encrypted version has the maximum possible SE, which makes them indistinguishable from each other and therefore proves the masking property, as shown in Fig. 8 .
Moreover, to appreciate graphically this masking property is interesting to show the signal waveforms of 8b/10b flows after the encryption module. As shown in Fig. 6 , 8b/10b symbols are formed by one control bit and eight data bits. In Fig. 6 , after the encryption operation, these are called K_out and D_out, respectively, and they are used by the 8b/10b encoder to generate 10 bits. Each 8b/10b symbol is a control or data one depending whether its K_out flag is '1' or '0', respectively. When no frames are transmitted (pattern A) and encryption is disabled, Ethernet physical layer always transmit continuously idle sets composed by two consecutive symbols, one control symbol (with K_out equals to '1') and a data symbol (with K_out equals to '0'). It means that the K_out pattern in this situation is a signal that switches continuously between '0' and '1', as shown in Fig. 9a . When frames are transmitted (patterns B, C, D, E), the K_out flag will behave as a blast signal, as the idle sets are only transmitted in the space between frames. During frame transmission only 8b/10b data symbols are transmitted which will make K_out flag remain to '0' as shown in Fig. 9b .
Finally, by enabling encryption, 8b/10b symbols are ciphered and K_out flag and D_out are randomized (in every flow A, B, C, D or E) making indistinguishable which pattern is being transmitted, as shown in Fig. 9c .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work the authors have presented a new block cipher operation mode able to preserve the format of the plaintext when encrypting a high speed data stream. A security analysis has been made proving that it is possible to get at least the same or better security than a traditional CTR mode working with a standard 128-bits block cipher. The proposed solution permits the use of classical block ciphers instead of ad-hoc stream ciphers whose cryptanalysis and design criteria are less understood, or FPE structures whose architecture is more complex and entails larger hardware resources.
A parametrization and implementation of this FPE proposal has been carried out for the specific case of optical Gigabit Ethernet communications, achieving an Encryp-tion_Rate/Slice better than in other existing FPE solutions, including FF1 and FF3 modes.
Finally, the masking property of the encryption at physical layer in 1000Base-X standard has been tested with the proposed operation mode, checking that different data patterns can be made indistinguishable from each other, including from the situation of no frame transmission.
APPENDICES APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to [23] , and taking into account that CTR-MOD is a CTR-like mode but using a modulo-S addition (instead of an XOR operation) and an underlying PRF function F K _MOD that maps integer values from 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to {0, . . . ,S − 1} instead from 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 as F K , it is possible to express the IND-CPA security of CTR-MOD in a similar way as in (2) such that:
where ADV PRF F K _MOD (B) is the prf-advantage of an adversary B over F K _MOD. Therefore, by obtaining this advantage it will be possible to get the expression for the IND-CPA advantage over the proposed scheme. The generic prf-advantage ADV PRF F K of any adversary over a PRF F K is defined in [24] and an explanation about it is detailed in the Appendix B.
Thanks to the games defined in Table 1 it is possible to express the term ADV PRF F K _MOD (A) according the following lemma: Lemma 2: Let be Func_MOD a function defined as in Lemma 1. Then any adversary A making q oracle queries when attacking the prf-security of Func_MOD will obtain an advantage bounded by the following expression:
where I = L − T and T = log 2 S. Lemma 3: Let be Func _MOD a function defined as in Lemma 1. Then any adversary A making q oracle queries when attacking the prf-security of Func _MOD will obtain an advantage such that:
By taking into account Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it is possible to derive the following expression from equation (15):
Finally, by substituting the expression of the term ADV PRF F K _MOD (A) in equation (14) it is possible to derive (3) which proves Theorem 2. For clarity purposes, proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are given in the Appendices C, D and E using the games definitions of Table 1 . Game definitions are explained in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B GAME DEFINITIONS
In this Section the definition of term ADV PRF F K and the explanation of games in Table 1 are described. These are necessary to develop the proof of Theorem 2 and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
A. PRF ADVANTAGE ADV PRF F K
The generic prf-advantage ADV PRF F K (A) of any adversary A over a PRF F K is defined in [24] according to the following definition:
Definition 1: Let F : K × {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L be a family of functions, and let adversary A be an algorithm that takes from an oracle a function g: {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L , that can be configured as a random function or a PRF F K depending on a bit b, and tries to distinguish which function has been taken. The function g is passed to the adversary as an argument and it returns a result bitb (b ← A(g)) meant as a guess at b. According to the game EX b F in Table 4 the prf-advantage of A over F K is defined as:
where P EX b F (A) = 1 is the probability that the result of the game EX b F (A) isb = 1. The game EX b F (A) is configured with the bit b. If b = 1 a key of length k bits is selected randomly from the keyspace K. It is expressed as K $ ← {0, 1} k , where the operator $ ← means a 'random selection'. In addition, the argument g for the adversary A is selected to be the PRF F K configured with key K . On the other hand, when the game EX b F (A) is configured with b = 0 the argument for A is a random function f , taken randomly from the whole set of functions Func(l, L) : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L , which is expressed as f $ ←  Func(l, L) . The value of ADV PRF F K (A) measures how well A is doing when distinguishing between f and F K . Game EX b F can be represented graphically as in Fig. 10 , where the oracle implements the function g, that can be F K or f depending on the value of b. The adversary A interacts with g by performingueries of l-bit values t i , t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t q−1 , and the oracle responds to the adversary queries with qL-bit output values g(t i ). Finally A returnsb meant as guess at b.
In order to obtain the expression for the ADV PRF F K _MOD (A) we have defined a set of games shown in Table 1 . In these games, as in game EX b F , the operator $ ← means a 'random selection', and Func(l, L), Func(l, l) VOLUME 8, 2020 and Func(l, T ) represent sets of functions such that Func(l, L) : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} L , Func(l, l) : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l and Func(l, T ) : {0, 1} l → {0, . . . ,S − 1} with T = log 2 S. In the same way as in game EX b F , games in Table 1 can measure the ability for an adversary A to distinguish between two functions depending on the configuration of the bits b and n. Moreover, in each game A performsueries of values t i , t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t q−1 , to an oracle implementing a function g. Adversary A receives from the oracle q output values g(t i ) and returns a result bit as in EX b F .
B. GAMES B AND D
Games E n F (A) and E n F (A) are games B and D respectively in Table 1 , they are only configured with the configuration bit n, and at the beginning of both a random key K is obtained,
In game B, E n F (A), adversary A tries to distinguish between functions F K _MOD and Func_MOD. F K _MOD is defined as in Section II, where F K _MOD(x) = F K (x) mod S, and F K is the PRF configured with the random key K . Func_MOD is a function obtained after applying modulo-S operation to the output of the function f , such that Func_MOD(x) = f (x) mod S. Function f is selected randomly from the set of functions Func(l, L).
In game D, E n F (A), adversary A tries to distinguish between functions E K _MOD and Func _MOD. E K _MOD is defined as in Section II, where E K _MOD (x) = E K (x) mod2 L , and E K is the PRF function that represents the block cipher of Fig. 2b configured with the random key K . Func _MOD is a function obtained after applying a modulo-2 L operation to the output of a function f selected randomly from the set of functions Func(l, l).
As summary, in E n F (A), adversary A tries to distinguish between a PRF and a random function with different input and output bit lengths, both followed by a modulo-S operation, while in E n F (A) adversary A tries to distinguish between a PRF and a random function with the same input and output bit lengths, both followed by a modulo-2 L operation.
C. GAMES A AND C
Games E nb F (A) and E nb F (A) are games A and C respectively, they are configured with the mode bit n and the configuration bit b, and at the beginning of both a random key K is obtained, such that K $ ← {0, 1} k . In E nb F (A) adversary A will try to distinguish between a random function selected from the set of functions Func(l, T ) and a function r that depends on the value of the mode bit n. When n = 1, this function is configured as r = F K _MOD as defined in Section II, while with n = 0, r = Func_MOD that is defined as in the previous subsection.
In E nb F (A) adversary A will try to distinguish between a random function selected from the set of functions Func(l, L) and a function r that depends on the value of the mode bit n. With n = 1, r = E K _MOD as defined in Section II, and when n = 0, r is configured as r = Func _MOD as defined in the previous subsection.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to game A in Table 1 and the definition of the prfadvantage in (19) , we can define the following prf-advantages of adversary A over F K _MOD and Func_MOD:
where P E nb F (A) = 1 is the probability that the result of the game E nb F (A) isb = 1. In the case of (20) we are measuring the advantage of A over F K _MOD as we are performing the game E 1b F (A), and in this case A tries to distinguish between the PRF F K _MOD and a random function taken from the set of functions Func(l, T ). Both F K _MOD and Func(l, T ) map values between {0, 1} l and {0, . . . ,S − 1}. In the case of (21) we are measuring the advantage of A over Func_MOD as we are performing game E 0b F (A) where A tries to distinguish between Func_MOD and a random function taken from Func(l, T ).
According to Table 1 , if b = 0 the input argument for adversary A is always the same in games E 00 F (A) and E 10 F (A), therefore P E 00
Then it is possible to derive the following expression from (20) and (21):
As the inputs for adversary A in games E n1 F (A) and E n F (A) are the same then P E n F (A) = 1 = P E n1 F (A) = 1 , which means that:
In Fig. 11a , a graphical diagram for game E n F (A) is shown. Adversary A makesueries to the oracle that implements the function F K _MOD or Func_MOD depending on the value of configuration bit n. The diagram in Fig. 11a can be represented also as in Fig. 11b . As both schemes are equivalent from the point of view of adversary A we can conclude that it is possible to build an adversary C from A that produces thesame result bit as A. Moreover, as the role of adversary C in Fig. 11b is the same as the role of adversary A in Fig. 10 when performing game EX b F (A), (23) can be rewritten as: As defined in Section II, F K (x) = E K _MOD(x), which means that:
On the other hand, thanks to game C in Table 1 , it is possible to define the following advantages:
where P E nb F (A) = 1 is the probability that the result of the game E nb F (A) isb = 1. In the case of (26) we are measuring advantage of A over E K _MOD, as we are performing game E 1b F (A), and in this case adversary A tries to distinguish between E K _MOD and a random function taken from the set of function Func (l, L) . In the case of (27), as we are performing game E 0b F (A) the adversary A tries to distinguish between Func _MOD and a random function taken from Func (l, L) , which is equivalent to measure the advantage over Func _MOD.
According to Table 1 , if b = 0 the input argument for adversary A is always the same in games E 00 F (A) and E 10 F (A), therefore P E 00 F (A) = 1 = P E 10 F (A) = 1 . Then, as E 00
Diagram of (a) experiment E n F (A) and (b) its equivalent using the adversary D. In both cases adversary A generates the same amount of queries to the oracles. In each query A sends t i word and receives g(t i ) symbol. At the end, adversary A tries to guess the configuration bitn. derive (28) from (26) and (27) .
In Fig. 12a , game E n F (A) is shown graphically. As Fig. 12a and Fig. 12b are equivalent from the point of view of adversary A, it is possible to build an adversary D from A that produces the same return bit than A. In addition, the role of adversary D in Fig. 12b is the same as the role of adversary A in Fig. 10 when performing game EX b F (A). Then equation (28) results as:
Therefore:
ADV PRF E K _MOD (A) = ADV PRF E K (D)+ADV PRF Func _MOD (A) (30) According to (30) , equation (25) can be written as:
31) which is the same expression as in equation (15) and then proves Lemma 1. . Domain 0, . . . , 2 L − 1 is mapped into interval 0, . . . , S − 1 . Each interval Si is mapped in the range 0, . . . , S − 1 . As 2 L is not a multiple of S the last green interval is called S last and it contains only R values that are mapped to the range 0, . . . , R − 1 .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove the Lemma 2 it is necessary to obtain the term ADV PRF Func_MOD (A), that depends on game E 01 F (A) and E 00 F (A) as shown in (21). This term measures the capability of A for distinguishing the function Func_MOD(x) = f (x) modS, where f is a random function taken from the set of functions Func(l, L), from a random function from the set Func(l, T ), where T = log 2 S and S is not a power of two. The function f maps values from the domain 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 . By applying modulo-S operation to the outputs of function f , values in the domain 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 are mapped to domain {0, . . ., S − 1}. Therefore function Func_MOD will map values from the domain 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 to {0, . . ., S − 1}, as random functions in the set Func(l, T ) do. In Fig. 13 , the way of mapping values from 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 to {0, . . . , S − 1} thanks to modulo-S operation is shown. As S is not a power of two, 2 L is not a multiple of S. Then the remainder R of the division between 2 L and S can be written as:
where m is the quotient of the division. According to (32) the range 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 can be divided in m blocks with S values each one and one last with only R values, as shown in Fig. 13 . The m blocks are called S i , with 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and the last one with R values is called S last . After modulo-S operation, values in each range S i will be equally distributed in destination range {0, . . . ,S − 1}, however the last range S last includes the last R values in the range {m · S, . . . ,m · S + R − 1} and they only are mapped in the first R values of the destination range, {0, . . . ,R − 1}. It will make that each value in the destination range {0, . . . ,R − 1} can have one more occurrence than values in the range {R, . . . ,S − 1}. Therefore, if each input of modulo-S operation were uniformly distributed in the range 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 it will be possible to consider that its output will not be uniformly distributed, as R is not zero. It means that the output of modulo-S operation would have the following probability distribution:
where P (x) is the probability of occurrence of value x at the output of the modulo-S operation.
During game E 0b F (A), the adversary A makesueries and they are not repeated. The queries are made to an oracle performing function g, that can be configured thanks to b value as g = Func_MOD or taken randomly from the set Func(l, T ).
In E 0b F (A), f ∈ Func(l, L) and it is a random function. According to [24] if the inputs of a random function f are not repeated we can consider that each output of f is randomly and uniformly distributed in its output range, which in this case is 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 , independently of anything else. The same assumption can be done with the case of a random function from the set Func(l, T ) we can consider that each of its output is random and uniformly distributed in the range {0, . . . ,S − 1}.
In the case of game E 00 F (A), as g is a random function taken from the set Func(l, T ), the final output from the oracle can be considered random and uniformly distributed in
However, in game E 01 F (A), the oracle performs as function g the function Func_MOD(x) = f (x) modS. As f is a random function with a uniform distributed output in the range 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 , the output of Func_MOD will have a probability distribution as in (33) owing to modulo-S operation.
Let us consider two situations when performing game E 01 F (A). The first of them is when during theueries made by adversary A, at the output of f ∈ Func(l, L) no value falls in the range S last , but in any of the remainng S i intervals. In this case the output of modulo-S could be considered randomly and uniformly distributed in the range {0, . . . ,S − 1}, which is a situation indistinguishable from the game E 00 F (A), where adversary analyzes the outputs from g ∈ Func(l, T ). Let us name this situation 'Good interval' or Gint.
The second case is the opposite, when during theueries performed in E 01 F (A), some output of f falls in the range S last , then we can consider that this result could make us perceive the behavior of Func_MOD no to be like a random function taken from Func(l, T ). Due to that it is possible to consider that, at least, a good adversary could have a chance to know that we are running E 01 F (A) instead of E 00 F (A). Let's name this situation 'Bad interval' or Bint.
If we call w1 to the event E 01 F (A) = 1 and w0 to the event E 00 F (A) = 1 then: P [w1] = P[w1|Gint] · P[Gint]
where P [Gint] and P [Bint] are the probabilities of Gint and Bint to occur during theueries made by the adversary in game E 01 F (A), respectively.
As the adversary cannot distinguish the situation Gint during game E 01 F (A) from game E 00 F (A) because the output from the oracle in both situations can be considered random and uniformly distributed, then:
In addition, by taking into account (34) and (35) we can rewrite (21) 
To get an upper bound for ADV PRF Func_MOD (A) we assume the worst case where a perfect adversary is able to always detect the function Func_MOD when running game E 01 F (A) and situation Bint is produced, which means that it always gives as result E 01 F (A) = 1. It means that with this perfect adversary P [w1|Bint] = 1. Therefore (37) can be rewritten as:
The probability for an output value of the random function f ∈ Func(l, L) of falling into the range S last , is equal to R 2 L , as this range has R values among the 2 L possible. Asueries are performed by the adversary A during game E 01 F (A), the probability for any of the q oracle outputs of falling in S last is P[Bint] =q · R 2 L . Therefore (38) can be expressed as:
By taking into account equation (32) , as I = L − T , T = log 2 S and m = 2 L /S , R can be expressed as:
Therefore (39) can be rewritten as:
which corresponds with the equation (16) and finishes the proof of Lemma 2.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Regarding the term ADV PRF Func _MOD (A), it is possible to make a similar reasoning to that for ADV PRF Func_MOD (A). In Func _MOD the output of the random function f ∈ Func(l, l) is subjected to a modulo-2 L operation. Thanks to this operation the output range of f , 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 , is mapped to the space 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 . This case differs from the situation of Lemma 2, when analyzing Func_MOD, where the space 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 is mapped to the range {0, . . . ,S − 1}.
In the proof of Lemma 2, the output interval of f ∈ Func(l, L) is 0, . . . ,2 L − 1 . It is divided in m subintervals S i with S values each one, and one last subinterval S last with the R remaining values. Each subinterval S i is mapped to {0, . . . ,S − 1} after modulo S operation while S last is mapped to {0, . . . ,R − 1}. This concludes in equation (39) obtaining ADV PRF Func_MOD (A) as a function of R, ADV PRF Func_MOD (A) ≤q · R 2 L . In the case of Func _MOD we could make the same reasoning as for Lemma 2, it is possible to divide the output range of f ∈ Func(l, l), 0, . . . ,2 l − 1 , into m intervals S i with 2 L values each one and one last subinterval S last with the R remaining values, where R is the remainder of the division between 2 l and 2 L . Then it is possible to derive an expression similar to (39) for ADV PRF Func _MOD (A):
In Lemma 2, S is not a power of two and 2 L is not a multiple of S, then it was possible to deduce that R = 2 L − m · S, however in this case as 2 l is a multiple of 2 L the remainder of its division is zero, that is R = 0.
It means that ADV PRF Func _MOD (A) = 0, which is the same expression as (17) and therefore it proves Lemma 3.
